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SOME COMMENTS ON THE REAPPORTIONMENT 
CASES 
Paul G. Kauper* 
ANY appraisal of the Supreme Court's decisions in the legislative reapportionment cases must necessarily distinguish between 
the basic policy ingredients and social consequences of the decisions 
on the one hand, and the question whether the results were reached 
by a proper exercise of judicial power on the other. Respecting the 
first of these considerations, I have no difficulty identifying the 
social advantages accruing from these decisions. Because of the stress 
on the population principle, the decisions will afford a greater voice 
to urban interests, will make the legislative process more responsive 
to current needs of particular concern to urban dwellers, will force 
the states to adhere more faithfully to standards that, in part at 
least, they have already set for themselves, and, in vitalizing the 
processes of state government, hopefully will contribute to the 
strength and integrity of our federal system. These plus considera-
tions must be weighed against the risk that the kind of apportion-
ment now required by judicial mandate will subject various kinds 
of minority interests to the overriding concerns of well-organized 
majorities and against the further consideration that the adoption 
of a single rule of apportionment, frozen into the Constitution by 
judicial interpretation, may preclude consideration of other and 
varied schemes that are responsive to the extensive, expert thinking 
that has gone into the subject. At this point, however, it may be 
conceded that the immediately discernible social advantages accruing 
from the decisions outweigh the more speculative disadvantages. 
But whether these results were appropriately achieved through 
the exercise of judicial power is another matter, and it is to this 
question that my comments are addressed. The Court's decisions 
deal with a problem that is essentially political: namely, what are 
the proper standards for legislative representation. Admittedly, the 
decisions are revolutionary in character, and here I speak particu-
larly of the recent state legislative reapportionment cases. These 
decisions, lacking support in judicial precedent, force the states to 
depart from legislative apportionment patterns that have had the 
sanction of history and from schemes that have been approved by 
the electors of the states through their own constitutional processes. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
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Moreover, the implementation of the Court's decisions has had the 
effect of giving federal and state courts a field day in using their 
equity powers with an almost cavalier disregard of the legislative 
power and of the orderly processes of government. We are being 
treated to an unprecedented assertion of judicial supremacy. These 
consequences give ground for pause before standing up to give three 
cheers for the decisions. 
I. EVOLUTION OF THE ONE MAN-ONE VOTE RULE 
Baker v. Carr1 opened this new chapter of judicial adventurism. 
That decision was understandable: I have no basic quarrel with 
the proposition that a state apportionment scheme is subject to 
judicial examination under the Constitution. The situation in 
Tennessee presented a particularly appealing case, since the state 
legislature had failed to act in accordance with the mandate of the 
state constitution and the state constitutional system provided no 
effective opportunity for redress through the processes of popular 
referendum or initiative. 
The real difficulty presented by Baker, it appears to me, was the 
Court's reliance upon the equal protection clause as the basis for 
judicial examination. It is difficult to avoid Mr. Justice Frankfurter's 
conclusion, stated in his dissent, that the Court, in the name of 
equal protection, was in effect opening up the question of what 
constitutes a republican form of government for judicial examina-
tion.2 This is the central issue in these cases-what form of appor-
tionment is compatible with a representative form of government-
and the guarantee of a republican form of government is the explicit 
constitutional provision relevant to the problem. But, the emphasis 
on equal protection and its subsequent development in terms of a 
discriminatory impairment of the right to vote paved the way for 
a judicial treatment that centered upon what I regard as a specious 
conception of personal right rather than upon the institutional 
aspect of the problem. This was not a necessary consequence, how-
ever, since the equal protection standard was broad and flexible 
enough to permit an inquiry directed to the question whether a 
state apportionment scheme was unreasonable or arbitrary when 
measured by a general standard of what is essential to the processes 
and institutions of representative government. 
The later decision of Gray v. Sanders,8 holding invalid the county 
I. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
2. Id. at 297. 
3. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
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unit system employed in Georgia to count votes cast for state officers 
in a state-wide election, understandably rested upon an equal pro-
tection ground. Once a state has determined the boundaries of a 
voting district (for the purpose of this election the state was the 
district) it is difficult to defend the rationality of a subclassification 
that deliberately weights the votes cast on a county basis, thereby 
giving to some electors a disproportionate voting power in the 
choice of state officers. Mr. Justice Douglas stated that "the concep-
tion of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to 
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one 
vote."• Gray dealt with a very special question that did not go to the 
heart of the legislative apportionment problem. Thus, the holding 
in Gray could be kept within narrow limits. But the broad state-
ment by Mr. Justice Douglas was expansible and capable of being 
forged into a principle premised upon personal right, which, if 
carried far enough, would furnish an almost automatic answer to the 
legislative apportionment problem. 
Next in progression was Wesberry v. Sanders/; wherein the Court 
committed itself to the one man-one vote principle (whatever this 
may mean in this context), so far as apportionment of the House 
of Representatives of the Congress of the United States is concerned. 
This decision was based upon interpretation of article I of the 
Constitution, which provides that Representatives shall be elected 
by the people of the several states. Starting with this constitutional 
requirement, the Court leaps to the dubious conclusion that districts 
set up under state law must, as far as practicable, be equal in popu-
lation. Mr. Justice Black found support for this conclusion in the 
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and in the views of 
prominent figures in the early history of the country. Mr. Justice 
Harlan, in his dissent, does an effective job in demolishing Mr. 
Justice Black's historical argument by establishing that those his-
torical facts prove nothing more than that it was intended that 
representation of a state in the lower house of Congress should be 
determined on a population basis as distinguished from the Senate 
where each state was to have two representatives regardless of pop-
ulation. Moreover, as Mr. Justice Harlan points out, article I of the 
Constitution commits to Congress the ultimate authority to legislate 
with respect to congressional districting. Congress did expressly 
4. Id. at !181. 
5. 376 U.S. l (1964). 
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exercise this power for some years and did require voting districts 
to be approximately equal. But, it later repealed this legislation 
and thereby left the fixing of congressional districts to the discretion 
of state legislatures. There is much strength in Mr. Justice Harlan's 
argument that Congress, with ultimate authority in this matter, has 
made a decision within the sphere of its constitutional competence, 
that this determines the status of the question as a "political ques-
tion," and that there is, therefore, no room at this point for judicial 
intervention. It should be kept in mind, in this connection, that the 
Court in its earlier opinion in Baker had said that it was the rela-
tionship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the 
federal government that had given rise to the political question 
concept, thereby strongly intimating that the Court would not 
impose its will in an area committed by the Constitution to con-
gressional discretion. Yet this aspect of Baker is promptly disre-
garded in Wesberry, which dealt with a question committed to a 
coordinate branch of the federal government. Wesberry can possibly 
be interpreted to mean that the standard stated by the Court is the 
one to be followed by the states in the absence of standards stated 
by Congress. Since the Constitution requires representation of the 
states in the House of Representatives to be based upon population, 
it is not unreasonable for the Court to say that equality of districts 
in terms of voting population should be the general rule unless 
different or more flexible standards are prescribed by Congress. This, 
however, is a strained interpretation of the Wesberry opinion, 
which, on its face, quite clearly demonstrates that the Court has 
now fixed a single constitutional standard for congressional district-
ing and that there is no room for congressional legislation that 
would permit deviation from this standard. Given this latter, more 
realistic construction, Wesberry does represent a substantial judicial 
intrusion upon congressional power and a judicial decision on a 
"political question" as the Court defined that concept in Baker v. 
Carr. 
A feature of the Wesberry case that deserves special attention is 
the emphasis in the latter part of Mr. Justice Black's opinion on the 
right to vote.6 He there points out that the right to vote for federal 
offices is a constitutionally created right under article I, and he 
makes it clear that, in his opinion, this right to vote is unconstitu-
tionally abridged or restricted unless congressional seats in a state 
are equally apportioned on a population basis. From the right to 
6. Id. at 17-18. 
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vote, he deduced the one man-one vote principle, which in tum is 
the key to equality in representation. There is a gap in this reason-
ing. No one was contending in this case that qualified voters were 
denied a right to vote for congressmen, and it was equally clear that 
every qualified voter had one vote. The right that the Court relied 
upon was not the right to vote, but rather a personal right to a 
numerically determined proportionate share of political influence. 
But the Constitution does not speak of such a right. Of course, there 
is a constitutionally created right to vote for federal officers, and 
Congress may act to protect this right by punishing fraud, corrup-
tion, and intimidation at the polls; the cases cited by Mr. Justice 
Black prove no more than this. It is another thing to say that this 
right to vote furnishes the key to legislative apportionment prob-
lems. 
It is also easy to see that, if the right to vote, expanded into a 
right to equal representation based on numbers, furnishes the basic 
premise in these cases, the Court has equipped itself with a simple 
answer to the apportionment problem. By assuming this question-
begging premise, the Court's conclusion is clearly indicated. This 
became evident when the Court handed down its decisions in the 
batch of state legislative reapportionment cases at the end of the 
recent term. 7 According to these cases, only one general standard 
-the population standard-is constitutionally permitted in appor-
tioning both houses of a state legislature. This in tum means that 
population must be apportioned to the several voting districts on 
an equal basis, so far as practicable, and that any deviation there-
from will be permitted only when a rational necessity for the 
deviation is shown. With one blow the Court struck at the heart of 
the well-established, traditional bicameral system of state govern-
ment. Even more surprising was the Court's decision in the Colo-
rado case, setting aside a legislative apportionment scheme that had 
been submitted to and approved by the electors in a free and open 
election. The Court felt it necessary to assume a guardian's role in 
order to protect the voters against themselves and in order to estab-
lish the Court's own predilection as to the kind of political system 
that our Constitution should sanction, even though this frustrated 
the expression of the popular will. 
7. Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado); Roman v. 
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia); 
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland); 
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964) (Alabama). 
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II. PROBLEMS OF .ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION 
As stressed earlier, the basic issue in these cases is what kind of 
representation processes and institutions are required to assure a 
government that rests upon the will of the people. This issue opens 
up a large and complex area involving many theories and modes 
of representation. Although the Constitution does not provide ex-
press answers for the states, the Court devised a single and simple 
solution: all representation must be based upon population alone, 
and population must be equally apportioned to the several districts. 
My basic criticism is that the Court, by judicial fiat, is projecting 
a simple, but absolute, solution to a complex problem. I find, 
nothing in history or political theories of representation to support 
the idea that representation on the basis of population equally 
apportioned is the only system consistent with either republican or 
democratic ideas of government. If effectuation of majority rule is 
the premise underlying this exclusive theory of representation, then 
why not carry through to the logical conclusion and require state-
wide election of all legislators? Or, if effective counting of each 
man's vote is the objective, then why not say that the Constitution 
requires a system of proportionate voting and representation? To 
raise these questions is to suggest the complexity of the problem 
and the range of possible solutions. The basic scheme of representa-
tion goes to the heart of a state's political processes: how political 
strength and influence shall be distributed and diffused. This is a 
matter that should be left to the people of the state to determine 
through their own constitutional processes, subject to a judicial check 
to determine whether the system chosen employs standards that are 
constitutionally objectionable, such as race or religion, or is otherwise 
so arbitrary or capricious that it cannot fit into any rational scheme 
of representation. Population, geography, the political organization 
of the state, the nature and variety of economic interests, and the 
diffusion or concentration of voting strength are all factors that are 
relevant in determining whether a state by its apportionment 
scheme has worked out a fair and balanced scheme of representation 
responsive to the state's own characteristics. The fact that the people 
of a state in an open election have by majority vote adopted a 
scheme that they deem responsive to the state's needs and character-
istics is also a consideration that should carry substantial weight in 
any judicial determination of the issue. And surely history should 
not be lightly disregarded. One may cheerfully concede that the 
pattern established for the Congress of the United States does not 
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in itself prove the validity of any particular apportionment scheme 
adopted by the states; yet, the long established state bicameral 
legislative scheme, which gives effect to varying theories of repre-
sentation as between the two houses, affords persuasive evidence of 
what we heretofore have understood the republican form of govern-
ment to include. 
The Court uses the equal protection clause as the formal vehicle 
for condemning apportionment schemes that do not satisfy the 
population standard. Its conclusion is that a system that does not 
afford equal representation to voters results in discriminatory 
denial of the right to vote. The right to vote emerges, then, as a 
critical element. This raises interesting questions. For example, 
what is the constitutional source of the right to vote? Article I 
assures the right to vote for federal officers. The right to vote for 
state officers must have its source elsewhere. The Court refers to it as 
a fundamental right. 8 As a fundamental right, it must have its 
source either in the substantive rights interpretation of the due 
process clause or in the guarantee of a republican form of gov-
ernment. 
Actually, in applying the equal protection clause, it is not neces-
sary to show that there is a discriminatory denial of a fundamental 
right. It is enough to show that a person is denied the equal enjoy-
ment of a right, privilege, or immunity by reference to an irrational 
classification. But, the Court chose to rely upon its characterization 
of the right to vote as fundamental in constructing its theory under 
the equal protection clause: The more fundamental the right, the 
more important it is that the Court inject its theory as to the kinds 
of classifications that may be used to restrict this right; an appor-
tionment system that does not rest upon equal apportionment of 
population dilutes and debases the fundamental right to vote and, 
hence, results in discriminatory treatment. It dilutes and debases 
the right because it does not afford equal representation. 
Here again, the right to vote gets tangled up with the Court's 
theory of proper representation. There can be no quarrel with the 
proposition that the Court should look carefully at classifications 
that determine a person's right to vote; however, what is really in-
volved in these cases is not a discriminatory denial of the right to 
' vote, but rather a violation of the judicially created right to a 
system that recognizes numbers as the only basis for representation. 
That the right to vote drops out of the picture at this point is 
8. Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 7, at 561-62. 
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evidenced by the fact that the Court, in speaking of population as 
the proper standard, does not speak of voting population but instead 
speaks of the total population of a ~ven district. 
By reading all that it does into the right to vote, the Court auto-
matically reaches its conclusion under the equal protection argu-
ment. For, if the right to vote carries with it a personal right to a 
proportionate share of political influence determined only upon 
the basis of numbers by the ratio of one man's vote to the total 
population in the state, then, of course, any system of apportionment 
not based upon equal apportionment of population must necessarily 
fail. The right that the Court creates leaves no room for a judicial in-
quiry into whether a legislative apportionment scheme can be fitted 
into a rational scheme of representation by reference to the charac-
teristics and problems of a particular state. The Court, by the 
premise it postulates on the nature of the right, assumes the con-
clusion respecting the equal protection argument. Indeed, by 
positing this right the equal protection argument becomes merely a 
facade that embellishes the conclusion. Thus, the decisions tum 
less upon equal protection than upon a new conception of funda-
mental right or upon the Court's implied understanding of what 
constitutes a republican form of government. 
Ample precedent supports the idea that legislative classification 
meets equal protection demands if it rests upo.µ a rational basis by 
reference to the purpose of the legislation. According to the estab-
lished theory of equal protection, a voter's right to equal treatment 
is satisfied if he is treated equally with other voters within a class 
established pursuant to a rational theory of legislative representa-
tion. As Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out, a wide variety of con-
siderations may be taken into account by the legislature or by the 
people themselves in determining the basis of representation.9 In 
deciding that the Constitution permits only representation based 
upon population equally apportioned, the Court makes a policy 
decision and expresses its preference for one exclusive theory of 
apportionment. 
9. "What constitutes a rational plan reasonably designed to achieve this objective 
will vary from State to State, since each State is unique, in terms of topography, 
geography, demography, history, heterogeneity and concentration of population, variety 
of social and economic interests, and in the operation and interrelation of its political 
institutions. But so long as a State's apportionment plan reasonably achieves, in the 
light of the State's own characteristics, effective and balanced representation of all sub• 
stantial interests, without sacrificing the principle of effective majority rule, that plan 
cannot be considered irrational." Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 
751 (1964). 
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It may be argued that, once the Court had embarked upon the 
process of examining apportionment schemes, it had a bear by the 
tail and had no choice in the end except to adopt a population 
standard, since any inquiry into the rationality of an apportionment 
scheme would have required the Court to articulate and weigh the 
factors determining rationality, whereas the population factor 
furnishes a clear-cut and simple standard. The simple solution to 
complex problems by the invocation of absolutes has its appeal, 
whether in politics or in law. As Dean Griswold has pointed out, 
reliance upon absolutes avoids the necessity of the kind of judgment 
that appraises all of the relevant considerations.10 Yet, it is this 
kind of judgment that goes to the heart of the judicial process. 
Surely the Court has the resourcefulness to conduct a meaningful 
review of state apportionment schemes, based upon the wide think-
ing and literature on the subject, without having to make a radical 
break with the system and theories that find ample support in 
American experience and practice. 
Justices Stewart and Clark demonstrated in their opinions that 
the Court could have made an inquiry into legislative apportion-
ment schemes without setting up any single, judicially formulated 
standard and that such an inquiry would have been meaningful 
and would not have meant a judicial rubber-stamping of just 
any apportionment scheme or practice.11 According to Mr. Justice 
Stewart, the equal protection clause demands but two basic at-
tributes of any plan for state legislative apportionment. "First, it 
demands that in the light of the state's own characteristics and 
needs, the plan must be a rational one. Secondly, it demands that 
the plan must be such as not to permit the systematic frustration 
of the will of a majority of the electorate of the state. I think it is 
apparent that any plan of legislative apportionment which could 
10. Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark, 8 UTAH. L. R.Ev. 167, 171-75 (1963). 
11. Both concurred in the holdings in the cases dealing with the legislative appor-
tionment plans in Alabama, Virginia, and Delaware. Mr. Justice Clark concurred in the 
result in the Maryland case, whereas Mr. Justice Stewart voted to vacate the judgment 
and to remand the case to the Maryland Court of Appeals for consideration of the 
question whether the Maryland apportionment "could be shown systematically to 
prevent ultimate effective majority rule." Both dissented in the New York and Colorado 
cases. Their basic views are set forth in their dissenting opinions in Lucas v. 44th 
Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, at 741 and 744 (1964). Mr. Justice Clark, while 
writing a short opinion of his own, also joined Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion. 
Mr. Justice Harlan, it should be noted, dissented from the decisions in all the 
recent state legislative apportionment cases. His dissenting opinion, applicable to all 
the cases, is found in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, at 589 (1964). His dissent, in ac-
cordance with his views expressed in dissent in Baker, Gray, and Wesberry, is based on 
the central proposition that questions of legislative apportionment are political ques-
tions not appropriate for judicial determination. 
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be shown to reflect no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious 
action or inaction, and that any plan which could be shown system-
atically to prevent ultimate effective majority rule, would be invalid 
under accepted Equal Protection Clause standards."12 
Mr. Justice Stewart's pragmatic approach makes much sense. It 
suggests a meaningful judicial inquiry that is empirical because it 
examines actual data to see what are the problems of representation 
faced by a state; it recognizes the variety of interests that may be 
appropriately considered by a state in its apportionment scheme; 
it preserves the primacy of the states in making choices in an area 
where the Constitution does not dictate a single formula; and it 
sets an outer limit on choice by referep.ce to a concept of "ultimate 
effective majority rule." I find it regrettable that the majority saw 
fit instead to impose a single standard that incorporates "their own 
notions of wise political theory."13 It strains credulity to suggest 
that this result is required by the Constitution. 
·Any comments upon the Court's decisions must take account 
also of the extraordinary authority assumed by some lower federal 
courts and some state courts in dealing with apportionment issues. 
Never before has the country witnessed such a spectacle of judicial 
power run riot. Courts have issued ultimata to legislatures and, in 
a few instances, have themselves undertaken to prescribe proper 
apportionment plans. This bold intrusion of the judiciary into the 
apportionment struggle invites the risk that the courts, wittingly or 
unwittingly, may become involved in the process of political gerry-
mandering. Moreover, in this election year, courts, in a scramble to 
implement the Supreme Court's decisions, have displayed a reckless 
impatience and imprudence in forcing adoption of new schemes 
without opportunity for careful consideration and at the expense 
of orderly election processes. For this chaotic state of affairs the 
Supreme Court must assume some responsibility. Its failure to 
establish standards in Baker created a situation that led lower 
courts to shift for themselves. What is more important, the Court 
could have firmly and effectively directed the lower courts to proceed 
in an orderly and deliberate way in implementing the new constitu-
tional principle. 
12. Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., supra note II, at 753-54. According 
to Mr. Justice Clark, "if one house is fairly apportioned by population ••• then the 
people should have some latitude in providing, on a rational basis, for representation 
in the other house." Id. at p. 742. 
13. Id. at 748. Mr. Justice Stewart dissenting in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly 
of State of Colorado. 
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III. Sol\IE CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The reapportionment cases again reveal the dilemma of judicial 
review in a democratic society. As long as a court is vested with the 
power to review legislation, the temptation is present to use judicial 
power as a means of creating constitutional policy in accordance 
with the Court's conception of the ideals served by the Constitution 
or in accordance with what the Court regards to be wise policy as 
determined by its own predilections and preferences. To adapt con-
stitutionally stated policy to new conditions is one thing; to create 
new constitutional policy in the guise of judicial interpretation is 
another. 
It may well be that the new constitutional principle forged by 
the Court is a good one. As stated at the outset, the total conse-
quences are likely to be salutary. Perhaps we should say that repre-
sentation based upon equal apportionment of population affords 
the only permissible basis of representation in a system that rests 
upon the will of the people. It may be that the idea of a bicameral 
legislature is obsolete. But, I am not prepared to accept the idea 
that these conclusions should be forced upon the people by the 
judiciary, absent a clear-cut mandate to this effect in the Consti-
tution. The notion that the Court, by creating new constitutional 
principles, should push the nation forward to the achievement of 
what the Court regards as the national ideal is not without its 
advocates. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion 
in Reynolds v. Sims, the view exists in some quarters that "every 
major social ill in this country can find its cure in some consti-
tutional 'principle,' and that this Court should 'take the lead' in 
promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act."14 
It may be that we shall make greater advances in our national life 
if basic policy questions are decided for us by what Professor Bur-
gess described as the "aristocracy of the robe,"15 or by what Judge 
Learned Hand more bluntly characterized as a "bevy of Platonic 
Guardians."16 Any court, however, that aspires to a constitutional 
policy-making role creates for itself the risks and hazards to which 
political organs are subject. I would prefer that the Court take a 
more modest view of its role and authority, if for no other reason 
than that it is important for the Court to retain the popular respect 
earned by it over the years as a judicial tribunal interpreting and 
14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624 (1964). 
15. 1 BURGESS, POUTICAL SCIENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 365 (1891). 
16. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). 
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applying the principles expressed in the Constitution. Fortunately, 
as our history amply demonstrates, public opinion and the reaction 
of the coordinate branches of the government operate with a salu-
tary force in restraining the Court when it ventures too far in im-
posing its will in areas that belong primarily in the domain of 
legislative discretion or the popular will. I expect this to be the case 
with respect to the new wave of judicial activism we are now ex-
periencing. 
The Court had a function to perform in rescuing the state 
legislative process from systems of apportionment that could not be 
:fitted into a rational scheme and that, in a number of instances, did 
not conform to the standard prescribed by state law itself. Indeed, 
if the Court had contented itself with the responsibility of requiring 
the states to bring their legislative apportionment up to date in 
order to conform with the plan of representation provided for in 
their own constitutions, it would have rendered a valuable service. 
But, in condemning all plans that do not conform to the Court's 
conception of wise apportionment policy-a policy buttressed by 
reference to a synthetic right forged from question-begging premises 
-and in reaching its sweeping conclusions in disregard of history 
and accepted principles of constitutional interpretation, the Court 
has gone far beyond the necessities of the case. 
